Connect 2025 **Attestation in Arm's Reference Firmware**

Establishing Trust and What's Next

Agenda

- Intro
- PSA Attestation
- Arm CCA Attestation
- PoC: DICE Protection Environment (DPE)
- Planned: enhance TPM support
- Planned: adding SPDM support

PSA: Platform Security Architecture

CCA: Confidential Compute Architecture

DICE: Device Identifier Composition Engine

TPM: Trusted Platform Module

SPDM: Security Protocol and Data Model

linaro Connect

Overview

- Trusted/Secure Boot
 - Bootloader verifies signatures of code or config at boot time, on-device
 - Halts boot on failure, but recovery is possible

Measured Boot

- \circ \quad Bootloader hashes code, config, or HW state and stores it securely
- No validation; just measurement
- $\circ \quad \ \ \, {\rm Functionality} \ \, {\rm is \ shared \ between \ bootloader \ and \ storage \ backend \ \ \, }$
- Examples storage backend: RSE Measured Boot, TPM PCR, DPE backend


• Attestation


- Runtime-signed report of measured system state
- Verified off-device; errors may restrict service
- Examples: PSA/CCA (by RSE/RMM), TPM2_Quote + Event Log (by TPM), SPDM or DPE (by an Internal RoT)


PSA Attestation



- Designed by Arm to be a lightweight attestation solution primarily targating the IoT market but applicable for high end SoC as well.
- Simple API to retrive attestation token and size info. Supports replay protection.
- Implementation defined hooks to get boot measurements and platform data when generating the report.
- The token has CBOR/COSE encoding; It consists of claims, which are key-value pairs.
- The RoT generates and signs the report by the Initial Attestation Key (ECDSA or HMAC)
- Trusted Services project exposes the API to the Linux user space: <u>link</u>
- Resources: <u>psa-token spec</u>, <u>API</u>, <u>implementation in TF-M</u>










CCA Attestation

- Built on PSA Attestation; tailored for Confidential Compute Architecture
- Attestation report = CCA platform token + Realm token
- RSE Responsibilities
 - Act as RoT: secure boot + stores measurements
 - Provides measured boot backend
 - Derives Realm Attestation Key (RAK)
 - Sign CCA Platform token with Initial Attestation Key (IAK)
- RMM Responsibilities
 - Interfaces with Realm Runtime to record REMs
 - Stores runtime + initial content measurement
 - Signs Realm Token with RAK
 - Binds tokens via H(RAKpub)
- Resources: <u>cca-token spec</u>, <u>RMM spec for ABI</u>
- Planned: Align the PSA and CCA token specs







- <u>DICE Protection Environment (DPE)</u> is a TCG specification for an isolated enclave used to store and manage DICE secrets, perform DICE derivations and sign attestation certificates.
- It defines the HW and the SW requirements to make DICE computation in a secure, isolated environment.
- Server-client architecture, where all bootloader components are a client of the entity that executes the DPE service.
- There are many implementation defined details in the spec, which can be specifed by profiles:
 - <u>Andorid profile / Open DICE</u> for client market
 - IRoT profile for server market
- Google has a SW-only implementation of the Open DICE; It is used in Android
- Arm has implemented a Proof of Concept (PoC) of the DPE, based on the Open DICE profile, which is available on the <u>Total Compute</u> platform.
- It is a hybrid implementation which mixes HW-backed and SW-only solutions to produce a single DICE certificate chain.
- Early boot stages are integrated with DPE. NS botloader gets the certificate chain from DPE, which is handed off to Linux and to the pVMs.
- Linaro Connect Madrid 2024: Enabling mobile trust thanks to DICE/DPE in Android

TPM




- <u>Trusted Platform Module</u> by TCG; Broadly used in the PC and server market
- Rich security features: key derivation, key storage, data sealing, X.509 certificate support
- Boot measurements are extended to PCR registers in the TPM and recorded in an Event Log by the SoC
- The attestation report is combination of the Event Log + Signed report which contains the PCRs values
- Discrete TPM (dTPM): an external device connected via SPI/I2C to the SoC
 - Certifiable
 - TF-A bootloaders support it as a measured boot backend: <u>link</u>
- Firmware TPM (fTPM): SW runs in a TEE within the SoC
 - HW dependencies: secure storage, RND generation, etc.
 - Trusted Services integrated ms-tpm to a secure partition: <u>link</u>
- Upcoming activities
 - Add TPM client support to RSE to replay measurements to a dTPM
 - \circ $\,$ CRB over FF-A support in Linux and edk2 $\,$



Connect

SPDM

- <u>Security Protocol and Data Model</u> by DMTF
- Device authentication, attestation and secure channel establishment
- Used on the server market to attest the SoCs and PCIe devices
- Data path:
 - In-band over PCIe between SoC and device
 - Out-of-band over I3C via MCP and BMC
- Request Response based protocol
- Use X.509 certificates for authentication
- Attested endpoint has an internal RoT, which signs the messages and provide certificates
- Upcoming activities:
 - Investigation to add support




BMC: Baseboard Management Controler MCP: Managebility Control Processor MCTP: Management Component Transport Protocol



9

Attestation architecture



Connect 2025

Thank You!