Technical presentation - 30 minutes (including q&a)
Attested TLS is an essential ingredient of any confidential computing solution. In this talk, we explore the design space and the corresponding typical security and performance tradeoffs of attested TLS protocols. We also summarize the standardization efforts on such protocols in the IETF. We then present what security properties are required from the attestation framework, and demonstrate how formalization can help get strong security guarantees. The attendees will learn best practices for using attested TLS in confidential computing to improve the Arm CCA ecosystem.
Usama has been working at TU Dresden since October 2017. His current research focus is on the formal specification and verification of attested TLS for confidential computing. He led the recently completed TEE formal specification project [1] (which included Arm CCA) and currently leads the new KBS formal verification project [2] in Confidential Computing Consortium (CCC) Attestation Special Interest Group (SIG). He also contributes to various research networks, such as EuroProofNet (WG3), Méthodes formelles pour la sécurité, Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) Usable Formal Methods Research Group (UFMRG), as well as engineering networks, such as Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) WG, Transport Layer Security (TLS) WG, and Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) WG. Further details are available at his webpage [3]. [1] https://github.com/CCC-Attestation/formal-spec-TEE [2] https://github.com/CCC-Attestation/formal-spec-KBS [3] https://tu-dresden.de/ing/informatik/sya/se/die-professur/beschaeftigte/muhammad-usama-sardar